sector petrolero

sector minero

sector agroindustrias

rubros de la empresa

Sectores destacados
Agroindustria


Un año menos dulce

Tras superar su récord histórico en 2011, el valor de las agroexportaciones peruanas no escapó a la coyuntura internacional... Ver más
Bebidas / Licores


Buen trago

La industria de bebidas peruana no se detiene, empujada especialmente por el mercado de aguas, que sigue ganando terreno...Ver más
Energía Eléctrica


Brillo continuo

Tras cerrar 2012 con un crecimiento de 6%, la demanda energética en el Perú continúa su tendencia al alza impulsada por el crecimiento...Ver más
Petróleo y Gas


Fondo sin pozos

Mientras crece la demanda de hidrocarburos en el país, que aumentó cerca de 50% entre 2001 y 2012, la producción...Ver más
Siderurgia / Metalurgia


Metales robustos

Según la Asociación Latinoamericana del Acero, el Perú fue uno de los países que impulsó el crecimiento del consumo de aceros...Ver más
Alimentos


Diente alicaído

2012 fue un año regular para la industria de alimentos peruana. Según la gerencia de estudios económicos de...Ver más
Comercio


Corazón económico

Un órgano vital de la demanda interna sin duda es el comercio moderno. Y este parece estar más jovial que nunca. De acuerdo a la Asociación...Ver más
Minería


Malos tiempos: protestas y precios

El sector minero en 2012 perdió fuerza en el Perú afectado por unos menores precios de los metales y por los conflictos...Ver más
Química / Farmacéutica


Locomotora en marcha

Los últimos 12 meses para la industria químico-farmacéutica han sido positivos, pero han generado retos...Ver más
Telecomunicaciones


Fondo sin pozos

Mientras crece la demanda de hidrocarburos en el país, que aumentócerca de 50% entre 2001 y 2012, la producción...Ver más
Servicios Financieros


Billeteras con futuro

Pese a la incertidumbre que rondó a algunas de las más grandes economías del mundo, el sector financiero peruano...Ver más
Construcción


Bloque sólido

En 2012 el sector construcción fue protagonista –nuevamente– de la producción nacional. De acuerdo a cifras oficiales...Ver más
Pesca


Marea movida

A diferencia de otros rubros, el de pesca sufrió un infarto sectorial en 2012. De acuerdo con el INEI, el rubro cayó 11,9%, resultado motivado por el menor...Ver más
Servicios de salud


Futuro saludable

Un sector que ha mostrado un comportamiento muy sólido desde hace un quinquenio es el de salud. Según la Clínica ...Ver más
Textil / Calzado


Venezuela, fan del textil peruano

El comité textil de la Sociedad Nacional de Industrias vaticinó que para 2012 las exportaciones textiles...Ver más

27 de enero del 2014 del 2000 al 2014

Tacna
A
Arica
PERU
BOLIVIA
the equidistance line
B: endpoint of the maritime boundary along
C: endpoint of the maritime boundary (intersection of
200 nautical miles
C
P
OCEAN
ACIFIC
B
the 200-nautical-mile limits of the Parties)
A
: endpoint of the agreed maritime boundary
from Chile's coast
2
from Peru's coast
00 nautical miles
- 66 -- 67 -
VII. CONCLUSION
196. The Court concludes that the maritime boundary between the Parties starts at the
intersection of the parallel of latitude passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 with the low-water
line, and extends for 80 nautical miles along that parallel of latitude to Point A. From this point,
the maritime boundary runs along the equidistance line to Point B, and then along the
200-nautical-mile limit measured from the Chilean baselines to Point C.
*
197. In view of the circumstances of the present case, the Court has defined the course of the
maritime boundary between the Parties without determining the precise geographical co-ordinates.
Moreover, the Court has not been asked to do so in the Parties’ final submissions. The Court
expects that the Parties will determine these co-ordinates in accordance with the present Judgment,
in the spirit of good neighbourliness.
*
* *
198. For these reasons,
THE COURT,
(1) By fifteen votes to one,
Decides that the starting-point of the single maritime boundary delimiting the respective
maritime areas between the Republic of Peru and the Republic of Chile is the intersection of the
parallel of latitude passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 with the low-water line;
IN FAVOUR: President Tomka; Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor; Judges Owada, Abraham,
Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Xue, Donoghue, Sebutinde,
Bhandari; Judges ad hoc Guillaume, Orrego Vicuña;
AGAINST: Judge Gaja; - 68 -
(2) By fifteen votes to one,
Decides that the initial segment of the single maritime boundary follows the parallel of
latitude passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 westward;
IN FAVOUR: President Tomka; Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor; Judges Owada, Abraham,
Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Xue, Donoghue, Gaja, Bhandari;
Judges ad hoc Guillaume, Orrego Vicuña;
AGAINST: Judge Sebutinde;
(3) By ten votes to six,
Decides that this initial segment runs up to a point (Point A) situated at a distance of
80 nautical miles from the starting-point of the single maritime boundary;
IN FAVOUR: Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor; Judges Owada, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna,
Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Donoghue; Judge ad hoc Guillaume;
AGAINST: President Tomka; Judges Xue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhandari; Judge ad hoc Orrego
Vicuña;
(4) By ten votes to six,
Decides that from Point A, the single maritime boundary shall continue south-westward
along the line equidistant from the coasts of the Republic of Peru and the Republic of Chile, as
measured from that point, until its intersection (at Point B) with the 200-nautical-mile limit
measured from the baselines from which the territorial sea of the Republic of Chile is measured.
From Point B, the single maritime boundary shall continue southward along that limit until it
reaches the point of intersection (Point C) of the 200-nautical-mile limits measured from the
baselines from which the territorial seas of the Republic of Peru and the Republic of Chile,
respectively, are measured;
IN FAVOUR: Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor; Judges Owada, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna,
Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Donoghue; Judge ad hoc Guillaume;
AGAINST: President Tomka; Judges Xue, Gaja, Sebutinde, Bhandari; Judge ad hoc Orrego
Vicuña;
(5) By fifteen votes to one,
Decides that, for the reasons given in paragraph 189 above, it does not need to rule on the
second final submission of the Republic of Peru.
IN FAVOUR: President Tomka; Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor; Judges Owada, Abraham,
Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cançado Trindade, Yusuf, Xue, Donoghue, Gaja,
Sebutinde, Bhandari; Judge ad hoc Guillaume;
AGAINST: Judge ad hoc Orrego Vicuña.
- 69 -
Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace,
The Hague, this twenty-seventh day of January, two thousand and fourteen, in three copies, one of
which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to the Government of
the Republic of Peru and the Government of the Republic of Chile, respectively.
(Signed) Peter TOMKA,
President.
(Signed) Philippe COUVREUR,
Registrar.
President TOMKA and Vice-President SEPÚLVEDA-AMOR append declarations to the
Judgment of the Court; Judge OWADA appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the
Court; Judge SKOTNIKOV appends a declaration to the Judgment of the Court; Judges XUE,
GAJA, BHANDARI and Judge ad hoc ORREGO VICUÑA append a joint dissenting opinion
to the Judgment of the Court; Judges DONOGHUE and GAJA append declarations to the
Judgment of the Court; Judge SEBUTINDE appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment
of the Court; Judge ad hoc GUILLAUME appends a declaration to the Judgment of the Court;
Judge ad hoc ORREGO VICUÑA appends a separate, partly concurring and partly dissenting, opinion
to the Judgment of the Court.
(Initialled) P. T.
(Initialled) Ph. C.

27 de enero del 2014 del 90 al 2000

preparing for the materialization of the parallel running through Boundary Marker No. 1, which the
delegates understood to be the maritime frontier, and that the delegates communicated such
understanding to their respective Governments.
165. The Governments of both Parties then confirmed this understanding. The Note of
5 August 1968 from the Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs of Peru to the chargé d’affaires of
Chile states:
“I am pleased to inform Your Honour that the Government of Peru approves in
their entirety the terms of the document signed on the Peruvian-Chilean border on
26 April 1968 by the representatives of both countries in relation to the installation of
leading marks to materialise the parallel of the maritime frontier.
As soon as Your Honour informs me that the Government of Chile is in
agreement, we will be pleased to enter into the necessary discussions in order to
determine the date on which the Joint Commission may meet in order to verify the
position of Boundary Marker No. 1 and indicate the definitive location of the towers
or leading marks . . .”
The Court notes Peru’s approval of the entirety of the document dated 26 April 1968. - 59 -
166. The Chilean response of 29 August 1968 from the Embassy of Chile to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Peru is in the following terms:
“The Embassy of Chile presents its compliments to the Honourable Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and has the honour to refer to the Meeting of the Joint
Chilean-Peruvian Commission held on 25 and 26 April 1968 in relation to the study of
the installation of the leading marks visible from the sea to materialise the parallel of
the maritime frontier originating at Boundary Marker No. 1.
On this point, the Embassy of Chile is pleased to accept on behalf of the
Government of Chile the proposals which the technical representatives of both
countries included in the Act which they signed on 28 [sic] April 1968 with a view to
taking the measures for the abovementioned signalling in order to act as a warning to
fishing vessels that normally navigate in the maritime frontier zone.
Given that the parallel which it is intended to materialise is the one which
corresponds to the geographical situation indicated by Boundary Marker No. 1 as
referred to in the Act signed in Lima on 1 August 1930, the Chilean Government
agrees that an ad hoc Joint Commission should be constituted as soon as possible for
the purpose of verifying the position of this pyramid and that, in addition, the said
Commission should determine the position of the sites where the leading marks are to
be installed.”
167. The Act of the Chile-Peru Mixed Commission in Charge of Verifying the Location of
Boundary Marker No. 1 and Signalling the Maritime Boundary of 22 August 1969 (hereinafter the
“1969 Act”), signed by the delegates of both Parties, introduces its task using the following
language:
“The undersigned Representatives of Chile and of Peru, appointed by their
respective Governments for the purposes of verifying the original geographical
position of the concrete-made Boundary Marker number one (No. 1) of the common
frontier and for determining the points of location of the Alignment Marks that both
countries have agreed to install in order to signal the maritime boundary and
physically to give effect to the parallel that passes through the aforementioned
Boundary Marker number one . . .” (Emphasis added.)
168. The 1969 Act recommends the rebuilding of the damaged Boundary Marker No. 1 on
its original location, which remained visible. The 1969 Act also includes a section entitled Joint
Report signed by the Heads of each Party’s Delegation, describing their task as follows:
“The undersigned Heads of Delegations of Chile and of Peru submit to their
respective Governments the present Report on the state of repair of the boundary
markers in the section of the Chile-Peru frontier which they have had the opportunity
to inspect on the occasion of the works which they have been instructed to conduct in
order to verify the location of Boundary Marker number one and to signal the
maritime boundary.” - 60 -
169. The Court observes that both Parties thus clearly refer to their understanding that the
task which they are jointly undertaking involves the materialization of the parallel of the existing
maritime frontier, with such parallel understood to run through Boundary Marker No. 1.
170. In order to determine the starting-point of the maritime boundary, the Court has
considered certain cartographic evidence presented by the Parties. The Court observes that Peru
presents a number of official maps of Arica, dated 1965 and 1966, and of Chile, dated 1955, 1961
and 1963, published by the Instituto Geográfico Militar de Chile, as well as an excerpt from
Chilean Nautical Chart 101 of 1989. However, these materials largely focus on the location of the
point “Concordia” on the coast and do not purport to depict any maritime boundary.
171. The Court similarly notes that a number of instances of Peruvian practice subsequent to
1968 relied upon by Chile are not relevant as they address the issue of the location of the
Peru-Chile land boundary.
172. The only Chilean map referred to by Peru which appears to depict the maritime
boundary along a parallel passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 is an excerpt from Chilean
Nautical Chart 1111 of 1998. This map, however, confirms the agreement between the Parties of
1968-1969. The Court considers that it is unable to draw any inference from the 30-year delay in
such cartographic depiction by Chile.
173. The evidence presented in relation to fishing and other maritime practice in the region
does not contain sufficient detail to be useful in the present circumstances where the starting-points
of the maritime boundary claimed by each of the Parties are separated by a mere 8 seconds of
latitude, nor is this evidence legally significant.
174. The Court considers that the maritime boundary which the Parties intended to signal
with the lighthouse arrangements was constituted by the parallel passing through Boundary Marker
No. 1. Both Parties subsequently implemented the recommendations of the 1969 Act by building
the lighthouses as agreed, thus signalling the parallel passing through Boundary Marker No. 1. The
1968-1969 lighthouse arrangements therefore serve as compelling evidence that the agreed
maritime boundary follows the parallel that passes through Boundary Marker No. 1.
175. The Court is not called upon to take a position as to the location of Point Concordia,
where the land frontier between the Parties starts. It notes that it could be possible for the
aforementioned point not to coincide with the starting-point of the maritime boundary, as it was
just defined. The Court observes, however, that such a situation would be the consequence of the
agreements reached between the Parties. - 61 -
176. The Court thus concludes that the starting-point of the maritime boundary between the
Parties is the intersection of the parallel of latitude passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 with
the low-water line.
VI. THE COURSE OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY FROM POINT A
177. Having concluded that an agreed single maritime boundary exists between the Parties,
and that that boundary starts at the intersection of the parallel of latitude passing through Boundary
Marker No. 1 with the low-water line, and continues for 80 nautical miles along that parallel, the
Court will now determine the course of the maritime boundary from that point on.
178. While Chile has signed and ratified UNCLOS, Peru is not a party to this instrument.
Both Parties claim 200-nautical-mile maritime entitlements. Neither Party claims an extended
continental shelf in the area with which this case is concerned. Chile’s claim consists of a
12-nautical-mile territorial sea and an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf extending to
200 nautical miles from the coast. Peru claims a 200-nautical-mile “maritime domain”. Peru’s
Agent formally declared on behalf of his Government that “[t]he term ‘maritime domain’ used in
[Peru’s] Constitution is applied in a manner consistent with the maritime zones set out in the
1982 Convention”. The Court takes note of this declaration which expresses a formal undertaking
by Peru.
179. The Court proceeds on the basis of the provisions of Articles 74, paragraph 1, and 83,
paragraph 1, of UNCLOS which, as the Court has recognized, reflect customary international law
(Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 91, para. 167; Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 674, para. 139). The texts of these
provisions are identical, the only difference being that Article 74 refers to the exclusive economic
zone and Article 83 to the continental shelf. They read as follows:
“The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone [continental shelf] between
States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.”
180. The methodology which the Court usually employs in seeking an equitable solution
involves three stages. In the first, it constructs a provisional equidistance line unless there are
compelling reasons preventing that. At the second stage, it considers whether there are relevant
circumstances which may call for an adjustment of that line to achieve an equitable result. At the
third stage, the Court conducts a disproportionality test in which it assesses whether the effect of
the line, as adjusted, is such that the Parties’ respective shares of the relevant area are markedly
disproportionate to the lengths of their relevant coasts (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, pp. 101-103, paras. 115-122; Territorial
and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 695-696,
paras. 190-193). - 62 -
181. In the present case, Peru proposed that the three-step approach be followed in the
delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two States. Peru makes the three following
points. First, the relevant coasts and the relevant area within which the delimitation is to be
effected are circumscribed by the coasts of each Party lying within 200 nautical miles of the
starting-point of their land boundary. The construction of a provisional equidistance line within
that area is a straightforward exercise. Secondly, there are no special circumstances calling for an
adjustment of the provisional equidistance line and it therefore represents an equitable maritime
delimitation: the resulting line effects an equal division of the Parties’ overlapping maritime
entitlements and does not result in any undue encroachment on the projections of their respective
coasts or any cut-off effect. Thirdly, the application of the element of proportionality as an ex post
facto test confirms the equitable nature of the equidistance line.
182. Chile advanced no arguments on this matter. Its position throughout the proceedings
was that the Parties had already delimited the whole maritime area in dispute, by agreement, in
1952, and that, accordingly, no maritime delimitation should be performed by the Court.
183. In the present case, the delimitation of the maritime area must begin at the endpoint of
the agreed maritime boundary which the Court has determined is 80 nautical miles long (Point A).
In practice, a number of delimitations begin not at the low-water line but at a point further seaward,
as a result of a pre-existing agreement between the parties (Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984,
pp. 332-333, para. 212; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002,
pp. 431-432, paras. 268-269; Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 130, para. 218). The situation the Court faces is, however,
unusual in that the starting-point for the delimitation in this case is much further from the coast:
80 nautical miles from the closest point on the Chilean coast and about 45 nautical miles from the
closest point on the Peruvian coast.
184. The usual methodology applied by the Court has the aim of achieving an equitable
solution. In terms of that methodology, the Court now proceeds to the construction of a provisional
equidistance line which starts at the endpoint of the existing maritime boundary (Point A).
185. In order to construct such a line, the Court first selects appropriate base points. In view
of the location of Point A at a distance of 80 nautical miles from the coast along the parallel, the
nearest initial base point on the Chilean coast will be situated near the starting-point of the
maritime boundary between Chile and Peru, and on the Peruvian coast at a point where the arc of a
circle with an 80-nautical-mile radius from Point A intersects with the Peruvian coast. For the
purpose of constructing a provisional equidistance line, only those points on the Peruvian coast
which are more than 80 nautical miles from Point A can be matched with points at an equivalent
distance on the Chilean coast. The arc of a circle indicated on sketch-map No. 3 is used to identify
the first Peruvian base point. Further base points for the construction of the provisional
- 63 -
equidistance line have been selected as the most seaward coastal points “situated nearest to the area
to be delimited” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2009, p. 101, para. 117). These base points are situated to the north-west of the initial base
point on the Peruvian coast and south of the initial base point on the Chilean coast. No points on
the Peruvian coast which lie to the south-east of that initial point on that coast can be matched with
points on the Chilean coast, as they are all situated less than 80 nautical miles from Point A (see
sketch-map No. 3: Construction of the provisional equidistance line).
186. The provisional equidistance line thus constructed runs in a general south-west
direction, almost in a straight line, reflecting the smooth character of the two coasts, until it reaches
the 200-nautical-mile limit measured from the Chilean baselines (Point B). Seaward of this point
the 200-nautical-mile projections of the Parties’ coasts no longer overlap.
187. Before continuing the application of the usual methodology, the Court recalls that, in its
second submission, Peru requested the Court to adjudge and declare that, beyond the point where
the common maritime boundary ends, Peru is entitled to exercise sovereign rights over a maritime
area lying out to a distance of 200 nautical miles from its baselines (see paragraphs 14 to
15 above). This claim is in relation to the area in a darker shade of blue in sketch-map No. 2 (see
paragraph 22 above).
188. Peru contends that, in the maritime area beyond 200 nautical miles from the Chilean
coast but within 200 nautical miles of its own coast, it has the rights which are accorded to a coastal
State by general international law and that Chile has no such rights.
Chile in response contends that the 1952 Santiago Declaration establishes a single lateral
limit for all maritime areas of its States parties whether actual or prospective, invoking the
reference in paragraph II of the Declaration to “a minimum distance of 200 nautical miles”.
189. Since the Court has already concluded that the agreed boundary line along the parallel
of latitude ends at 80 nautical miles from the coast, the foundation for the Chilean argument does
not exist. Moreover, since the Court has decided that it will proceed with the delimitation of the
overlapping maritime entitlements of the Parties by drawing an equidistance line, Peru’s second
submission has become moot and the Court need not rule on it.
190. After Point B (see paragraph 186 above), the 200-nautical-mile limits of the Parties’
maritime entitlements delimited on the basis of equidistance no longer overlap. The Court
observes that, from Point B, the 200-nautical-mile limit of Chile’s maritime entitlement runs in a
generally southward direction. The final segment of the maritime boundary therefore proceeds
from Point B to Point C, where the 200-nautical-mile limits of the Parties’ maritime entitlements
intersect. Arc of a circle with a radius of
80 nautical miles from Point A
Agreed maritime boundary
200 nautical miles
from Chile's coast
C
PACIFIC
B
from Peru's coast
OCEAN
200 nautical miles
A
BOLIVIA
CHILE
Ilo
PERU
Arica
Tacna
Construction of the
provisional equidistance line
WGS 84
This sketch-map has been prepared
Sketch-map No. 3:
for illustrative purposes only.
Mercator Projection (18° 20' S)
- 64 -- 65 -
191. The Court must now determine whether there are any relevant circumstances calling for
an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line, with the purpose, it must always be recalled, of
achieving an equitable result. In this case, the equidistance line avoids any excessive amputation of
either State’s maritime projections. No relevant circumstances appear in the record before the
Court. There is accordingly no basis for adjusting the provisional equidistance line.
192. The next step is to determine whether the provisional equidistance line drawn from
Point A produces a result which is significantly disproportionate in terms of the lengths of the
relevant coasts and the division of the relevant area. The purpose is to assess the equitable nature
of the result.
193. As the Court has already noted (see paragraph 183 above), the existence of an agreed
line running for 80 nautical miles along the parallel of latitude presents it with an unusual situation.
The existence of that line would make difficult, if not impossible, the calculation of the length of
the relevant coasts and of the extent of the relevant area, were the usual mathematical calculation of
the proportions to be undertaken. The Court recalls that in some instances in the past, because of
the practical difficulties arising from the particular circumstances of the case, it has not undertaken
that calculation. Having made that point in the case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Malta) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 53, para. 74), it continued in these terms:
“if the Court turns its attention to the extent of the areas of shelf lying on each side of
the line, it is possible for it to make a broad assessment of the equitableness of the
result, without seeking to define the equities in arithmetical terms” (ibid., p. 55,
para. 75).
More recently, the Court observed that, in this final phase of the delimitation process, the
calculation does not purport to be precise and is approximate; “[t]he object of delimitation is to
achieve a delimitation that is equitable, not an equal apportionment of maritime areas” (Maritime
Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 100,
para. 111; see similarly Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, pp. 66-67, para. 64, and p. 68, para. 67,
referring to difficulties, as in the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) case, in
defining with sufficient precision which coasts and which areas were to be treated as relevant; and
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial
Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 433-448, paras. 272-307, where although
the Court referred to the relevant coastlines and the relevant area, it made no precise calculation of
them). In such cases, the Court engages in a broad assessment of disproportionality.
194. Given the unusual circumstances of this case, the Court follows the same approach here
and concludes that no significant disproportion is evident, such as would call into question the
equitable nature of the provisional equidistance line.
195. The Court accordingly concludes that the maritime boundary between the two Parties
from Point A runs along the equidistance line to Point B, and then along the 200-nautical-mile limit
measured from the Chilean baselines to Point C (see sketch-map No. 4: Course of the maritime
boundary). Ilo
Sketch-map No. 4:
Course of the maritime boundary
This sketch-map has been prepared
for illustrative purposes only.
Mercator Projection (18° 20' S)
WGS 84
CHILE

27 de nero del 2014 del 80 al 90

was issued five months prior to the Declaration of Santiago.
There is no need to underline the convenience of preventing the difficulties
which would arise in the absence of an express and appropriate maritime demarcation,
or as the result of some deficiency therein which could affect the amicable conduct of
relations between Chile and Peru.”
138. On 13 June 1986, in an official communiqué, the Chilean Foreign Ministry said that:
“Ambassador Bákula expressed the interest of the Peruvian Government to start
future conversations between the two countries on their points of view regarding
maritime delimitation.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, taking into consideration the good relations
existing between both countries, took note of the above stating that studies on this
matter shall be carried out in due time.” - 52 -
139. Peru contends that the Bákula Memorandum is perfectly clear. In it Peru spelled out the
need for “the formal and definitive delimitation” of their maritime spaces, distinguishing it from
the ad hoc arrangements for specific purposes, such as the 1954 fisheries policing tolerance zone.
It called for negotiations, not “renegotiations”. And, Peru continues, Chile did not respond by
saying that there was no need for such a delimitation because there was already such a boundary in
existence. Rather “studies . . . are to be carried out”. Peru, based on the Memorandum and this
response, also contends that the practice after that date which Chile invokes cannot be significant.
140. Chile, in addition to submitting that the Bákula Memorandum called for a renegotiation
of an existing boundary, said that it did that on the (wrong) assumption that the maritime zones
newly recognized in UNCLOS called for the existing delimitation to be revisited. As well, Peru
did not renew its request to negotiate. Chile submits that the fact that Peru was seeking a
renegotiation was reflected in contemporaneous comments by the Peruvian Foreign Minister,
reported in the Chilean and Peruvian press.
*
141. The Court does not read the Bákula Memorandum as a request for a renegotiation of an
existing maritime boundary. Rather, it calls for “the formal and definitive delimitation of the
marine spaces”. While Peru does recognize the existence of the special zone, in its view that zone
did not satisfy the requirements of safety nor did it allow an appropriate administration of marine
resources; further, an extensive interpretation of the Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement
would negatively affect Peru’s legitimate interests. In the Court’s view, the terms used in that
Memorandum do acknowledge that there is a maritime boundary, without giving precise
information about its extent. The Court does not see the newspaper accounts as helpful. They do
not purport to report the speech of the Peruvian Minister in full.
142. There is force in the Chilean contention about Peru’s failure to follow up on the issues
raised in the Bákula Memorandum in a timely manner: according to the record before the Court,
Peru did not take the matter up with Chile at the diplomatic level again until 20 October 2000,
before repeating its position in a Note to the United Nations Secretary-General in January 2001 and
to Chile again in July 2004. However, the Court considers that the visit by Ambassador Bákula
and his Memorandum do reduce in a major way the significance of the practice of the Parties after
that date. The Court recalls as well that its primary concern is with the practice of an earlier time,
that of the 1950s, as indicating the extent of the maritime boundary at the time the Parties
acknowledged that it existed. - 53 -
J. Practice after 1986
143. The Court has already considered the Parties’ legislative practice from the 1950s and
1960s (see paragraphs 119 to 122 above). Chile also relies on two pieces of legislation from 1987:
a Peruvian Supreme Decree adopted on 11 June 1987 and a Chilean Supreme Decree adopted on
26 October of that year. Chile sees these instruments as evidence that, in defining the areas of
sovereign control by their navies, the Parties respected the maritime boundary.
144. The Court notes that these Decrees define the limits of the Parties’ internal maritime
districts. However, as Peru points out in respect of its own Decree, while these instruments define
the northern and southern limits of districts with some specificity (by reference to parallels of
latitude), that is not the case for those limits abutting international boundaries between Ecuador and
Peru, Peru and Chile, or Chile and Argentina. These Decrees define the internal limits of the
jurisdiction of certain domestic authorities within Chile and within Peru; they do not purport to
define the international limits of either State. In view also of the temporal considerations
mentioned above, the Court does not see these Decrees as significant.
145. Peru in addition referred the Court to a Chilean Decree of 1998 defining benthonic
areas of the Chilean coast; the northern limit ran to the south-west. But, as Chile says, the Decree
was concerned only with the harvesting of living resources on and under the sea-bed within its
“territorial seas”. The Court does not see this Decree as significant for present purposes.
146. The Court returns to evidence of enforcement measures between the Parties. The next
capture recorded in the case file after May 1986 is from 1989: the Peruvian interception and
capture of two Chilean fishing vessels within Peruvian waters, 9.5 nautical miles from land and
1.5 nautical miles north of the parallel.
147. Chile also provided information, plotted on a chart, of Peruvian vessels captured in
1984 and from 1994 in the waters which, in Chile’s view, are on its side of the maritime boundary.
The information relating to 1984 records 14 vessels but all were captured within 20 nautical miles
of the coast; in 1994 and 1995, 15, all within 40 nautical miles; and it is only starting in 1996 that
arrests frequently occurred beyond 60 nautical miles. Those incidents all occurred long after the
1950s and even after 1986. The Court notes, however, that Chile’s arrests of Peruvian vessels
south of the parallel, whether they took place within the special zone or further south, provide some
support to Chile’s position, although only to the extent that such arrests were met without protest
by Peru. This is the case even with respect to arrests taking place after 1986. - 54 -
148. Given its date, the Court does not consider as significant a sketch-map said to be part of
the Chilean Navy’s Rules of Engagement in the early 1990s and which depicts a Special Maritime
Frontier Zone stretching out to the 200-nautical-mile limit, or information provided by Chile in
respect of reports to the Peruvian authorities by foreign commercial vessels between 2005 and 2010
and to the Chilean authorities by Peruvian fishing vessels across the parallel.
K. The extent of the agreed maritime boundary: conclusion
149. The tentative conclusion that the Court reached above was that the evidence at its
disposal does not allow it to conclude that the maritime boundary, the existence of which the
Parties acknowledged at that time, extended beyond 80 nautical miles along the parallel from its
starting-point. The later practice which it has reviewed does not lead the Court to change that
position. The Court has also had regard to the consideration that the acknowledgment, without
more, in 1954 that a “maritime boundary” exists is too weak a basis for holding that it extended far
beyond the Parties’ extractive and enforcement capacity at that time.
150. Broader considerations relating to the positions of the three States parties to the
1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement, particularly the two Parties in this case, in the
early 1950s demonstrates that the primary concern of the States parties regarding the more distant
waters, demonstrated in 1947, in 1952, in 1954 (in their enforcement activities at sea as well as in
their own negotiations), in 1955 and throughout the United Nations process which led to the
1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea, was with presenting a position of solidarity, in particular,
in respect of the major third countries involved in long distance fisheries. The States parties were
concerned, as they greatly increased their fishing capacity, that the stock was not depleted by those
foreign fleets.
The seizure of the Onassis whaling fleet, undertaken by Peru in defence of the claims made
by the three signatories to the 1952 Santiago Declaration (see paragraph 75 above), was indicative
of these concerns. This action occurred 126 nautical miles off of the Peruvian coast. Prior to its
seizure, the fleet unsuccessfully sought permission from Peru that it be allowed to hunt between 15
and 100 nautical miles from the Peruvian coast.
151. The material before the Court concerning the Parties’ focus on solidarity in respect of
long distance fisheries does not provide it with precise information as to the exact extent of the
maritime boundary which existed between the Parties. This issue could be expected to have been
resolved by the Parties in the context of their tacit agreement and reflected in the treaty which
acknowledges that tacit agreement, namely the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement.
This did not happen. This left some uncertainty as to the precise length of the agreed maritime
boundary. However, based on an assessment of the entirety of the relevant evidence presented to
it, the Court concludes that the agreed maritime boundary between the Parties extended to a
distance of 80 nautical miles along the parallel from its starting-point. - 55 -
V. THE STARTING-POINT OF THE AGREED MARITIME BOUNDARY
152. Having concluded that there exists a maritime boundary between the Parties, the Court
must now identify the location of the starting-point of that boundary.
153. Both Parties agree that the land boundary between them was settled and delimited more
than 80 years ago in accordance with Article 2 of the 1929 Treaty of Lima (see paragraph 18)
which specifies that “the frontier between the territories of Chile and Peru . . . shall start from a
point on the coast to be named ‘Concordia’, ten kilometres to the north of the bridge over the river
Lluta”. Article 3 of the 1929 Treaty of Lima stipulates that the frontier is subject to demarcation by
a Mixed Commission consisting of one member appointed by each Party.
154. According to Peru, the delegates of the Parties to the Mixed Commission could not
agree on the exact location of Point Concordia. Peru recalls that this was resolved through
instructions issued by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each State to their delegates in April 1930
(hereinafter the “Joint Instructions”), specifying to the delegates that Point Concordia was to be the
point of intersection between the Pacific Ocean and an arc with a radius of 10 km having its centre
on the bridge over the River Lluta, with the land frontier thus approaching the sea as an arc tending
southward. Peru notes that the Joint Instructions also provided that “[a] boundary marker shall be
placed at any point of the arc, as close to the sea as allows preventing it from being destroyed by
the ocean waters”.
155. Peru recalls that the Final Act of the Commission of Limits Containing the Description
of Placed Boundary Markers dated 21 July 1930 (hereinafter the “Final Act”), agreed by the
Parties, records that “[t]he demarcated boundary line starts from the Pacific Ocean at a point on the
seashore ten kilometres northwest from the first bridge over the River Lluta of the Arica-La Paz
railway” (emphasis added). Peru argues that the Final Act then indicates that the first marker along
the physical demarcation of the land boundary is Boundary Marker No. 1 (Hito No. 1), located
some distance from the low-water line so as to prevent its destruction by ocean waters at
18° 21' 03'' S, 70° 22' 56'' W. Peru thus considers that the Final Act distinguishes between a
“point” as an abstract concept representing the geographical location of the starting-point of the
land boundary (i.e., Point Concordia) and “markers” which are actual physical structures along the
land boundary. In Peru’s view, as the Final Act refers to both the point derived from Article 2 of
the 1929 Treaty of Lima and Boundary Marker No. 1, these two locations must be distinct. Thus,
relying on both the Joint Instructions and the Final Act, Peru maintains that Boundary Marker
No. 1 was not intended to mark the start of the agreed land boundary but was simply intended to
mark, in a practical way, a point on the arc constituting such boundary. Peru moreover refers to
contemporaneous sketch-maps which are said to clearly demonstrate that the land boundary does
not start at Boundary Marker No. 1. Peru further contends that the reference in the Final Act to
Boundary Marker No. 1 as being located on the “seashore” is a mere general description, with this
being consistent with the general manner in which other boundary markers are described in the
same document. Finally, Peru clarifies that the Final Act agrees to give Boundary Marker No. 9,
located near the railway line, the name of “Concordia” for symbolic reasons, an explanation with
which Chile agrees. - 56 -
156. In Chile’s view, the outcome of the 1929 Treaty of Lima and 1930 demarcation process
was that the Parties agreed that Boundary Marker No. 1 was placed on the seashore with
astronomical co-ordinates 18° 21' 03'' S, 70° 22' 56'' W and that the land boundary started from this
Marker. Chile characterizes the Joint Instructions as indicating that there would be a starting-point
on the coast of the land boundary, instructing the delegates to ensure the placement of a marker to
indicate such starting-point. Chile relies on an Act of Plenipotentiaries dated 5 August 1930 signed
by the Ambassador of Chile to Peru and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, claiming that it
records the “definitive location and characteristics” of each boundary marker and acknowledges
that the boundary markers, beginning in order from the Pacific Ocean, demarcate the
Peruvian-Chilean land boundary.
157. Peru considers that Chile’s claim that Boundary Marker No. 1 is the starting-point of
the land boundary faces two insurmountable problems. For Peru, the first such problem is that it
means that an area of the land boundary of approximately 200 metres in length has not been
delimited, which is not the intention of the 1929 Treaty of Lima and the Final Act. The second
problem, according to Peru, is that a maritime boundary cannot start on dry land some 200 metres
inland from the coast, referring to what it claims to be a “cardinal principle” of maritime
entitlement that the “land dominates the sea”. Alternatively, Peru notes that Chile’s interpretation
requires that the maritime boundary starts where the parallel passing through Boundary Marker
No. 1 reaches the sea, with this being inconsistent with the 1929 Treaty of Lima and the Joint
Instructions which clearly refer to the land boundary as following an arc southward from Boundary
Marker No. 1. Peru argues that, at least until the 1990s, Chile’s own cartographic and other
practice clearly acknowledges the starting-point of the land boundary as being Point Concordia, a
point recognized as distinct from Boundary Marker No. 1.
158. Chile argues that the lighthouse arrangements of 1968-1969 are also relevant in that
they involved a joint verification of the exact physical location of Boundary Marker No. 1.
According to Chile, the 1952 Santiago Declaration did not identify the parallel running through the
point where the land frontier reaches the sea. The observance and identification of such parallel by
mariners gave rise to practical difficulties between the Parties, as a result of which they agreed to
signal such parallel with two lighthouses aligned through Boundary Marker No. 1. Chile refers to a
document dated 26 April 1968, signed by both Parties, which it claims represents an agreement that
it is the parallel of the maritime frontier which would be marked by the lighthouses. Thus, Chile
claims that “[t]he 1968-1969 arrangements and the signalling process as a whole confirmed Hito
No. 1 as the reference point for the parallel of latitude constituting the maritime boundary between
the Parties”, further contending that the Parties have also used the parallel passing through this
point as the maritime boundary for the capture and prosecution of foreign vessels. Chile further
argues that there is corresponding Peruvian practice between 1982 and 2001 treating the parallel
running through Boundary Marker No. 1 as the southernmost point of Peruvian territory. - 57 -
159. Peru recalls that when it proposed to Chile, in 1968, to conclude the lighthouse
arrangements, it suggested that it could be “convenient, for both countries, to proceed to build posts
or signs of considerable dimensions and visible at a great distance, at the point at which the
common border reaches the sea, near boundary marker number one”, with Peru submitting that the
language of “near Boundary Marker No. 1” clearly indicates that this point was distinct from the
seaward terminus of the land boundary at Point Concordia. Peru then continues to explain that the
placement of the Peruvian lighthouse at Boundary Marker No. 1 was motivated by practical
purposes, arguing that as the purpose of the arrangement was to provide general orientation to
artisanal fishermen operating near the coast, not to delimit a maritime boundary, aligning the lights
along Boundary Marker No. 1 proved sufficient.
160. The Peruvian Maritime Domain Baselines Law, Law No. 28621 dated
3 November 2005, identifies the co-ordinates of Point Concordia as 18° 21' 08'' S, 70° 22' 39'' W,
as measured on the WGS 84 datum. The Law sets out 266 geographical co-ordinates used to
measure Peru’s baselines, culminating in so-called “Point 266”, which Peru claims coincides with
Point Concordia.
161. Peru contends that Chile has sought, in recent years, to unsettle what it claims to be the
Parties’ previous agreement that the starting-point of the land boundary is Point Concordia,
referring in this regard to an incident in early 2001 in which Chile is alleged to have placed a
surveillance booth between Boundary Marker No. 1 and the seashore, an action which elicited an
immediate protest from Peru, with this booth being subsequently removed. Chile claims that its
decision to remove this booth was motivated by the proposals of the armies of both Parties that no
surveillance patrols occur within 100 metres of the international land boundary, with Chile
claiming that it duly reserved its position regarding the course of the land boundary. Peru refers
also in this regard to Chilean attempts to pass internal legislation in 2006-2007 referring to the
starting-point of the land boundary as the intersection with the seashore of the parallel passing
through Boundary Marker No. 1, rather than Point Concordia. Chile considers that its failure to
pass the relevant legislation in its originally proposed form was not connected to the substance of
the aforementioned reference.
*
162. The Court notes that on 20 October 2000, Peru communicated to Chile that the Parties
disagreed concerning the status of the parallel passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 as a
maritime boundary. On 9 January 2001, Peru informed the Secretary-General of the United
Nations that it did not agree with Chile’s understanding that a parallel constituted the maritime
boundary between them at 18° 21' 00'' S. On 19 July 2004, Peru described the situation as being
one in which exchanges between the Parties had revealed “totally dissenting and opposed juridical
- 58 -
positions about the maritime delimitation which, in accordance with International Law, evidence a
juridical dispute”. In such circumstances, the Court will not consider the arguments of the Parties
concerning an incident involving a surveillance booth in 2001, the Peruvian Maritime Domain
Baselines Law dated 3 November 2005 or the Chilean legislative initiatives in 2006-2007, as such
events occurred after it had become evident that a dispute concerning this issue had arisen and thus
these actions could be perceived as motivated by the Parties’ positions in relation thereto.
163. The Court observes that a considerable number of the arguments presented by the
Parties concern an issue which is clearly not before it, namely, the location of the starting-point of
the land boundary identified as “Concordia” in Article 2 of the 1929 Treaty of Lima. The Court’s
task is to ascertain whether the Parties have agreed to any starting-point of their maritime
boundary. The jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the issue of the maritime boundary is not
contested.
164. The Court notes that during the early preparations for the lighthouse arrangements in
April 1968 (discussed at paragraph 96 above) delegates of both Parties understood that they were